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The importance of increments to an existing highway system depends upon their contributions to the
accessibility provided by the existing network. Nearly 40 years ago, Mohring [1965] suggested this
logic for planning optimal highway investment programs. He argued it could be implemented by measuring
the quasi-rents generated by specific additions to an existing roadway system. This paper uses a unique
set of additions to a loop roadway in metropolitan Phoenix, together with detailed records of housing
sales over the past decade, to meet this need. We find that estimated increases in capitalized housing
values due to four segments added during this period range from 73 to over 273 million dollars per
mile of the roadway addition.
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Valuing Incremental Highway Capacity in a Network 
I. Introduction 
  A highway is a network whose economic value depends on its inter-linked 
connections. Some links have greater value than others. While this judgment seems like 
common sense, to our knowledge no one has measured how specific roadway segments 
contribute to a highway network. This task is especially relevant for recent policy debates 
about failing infrastructure and how to prioritize spending. One third of the eighty one 
billion in spending on infrastructure in the stimulus package under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is for highway and bridge projects. Yet, there 
has been little guidance offered on how to select among competing projects, aside from 
the criterion of being ready to start quickly.
1  
  In October of 1985 Maricopa County voters approved a one half cent sales tax for 
twenty years for construction of controlled access highways. Eligibility for the funds 
requires that the facilities be part of the county’s Regional Transportation Plan and a 
component of the State Highway System. Proposition 400 approved by county voters in 
2004 extends the sales tax for another twenty years to 2025. These tax resources are for 
projects that involve new freeways, widening of existing freeways, and for bus and high 
speed rail. A current example of one of these projects is a proposed new segment of the 








Department of Transportation recently recommended scaling back the project with the 
planned right of way reduced from ten to eight lanes and a change in route based on 
budget shortfalls. Three alternatives are listed for the North-South segment completing 
the loop. The original objective of the funding initiative was to improve the roadway 
network in the metropolitan area, enhancing overall accessibility. Yet in discussing these 
alternatives the costs and community impacts were the primary reasons identified in 
describing the changes. All alternatives are implicitly considered equivalent in their 
contribution to the network. Figure 1 displays the proposed route alternatives. As the map 
displays there are differences in the potential effects of these alternatives on the areas that 
are readily linked to the loop network. Our analysis for completed segments suggests that 
these types of differences can be important to the value of connector roadways. 
  Few lay observers would have difficulty with this conclusion. Nonetheless when 
there are public or professional comments on these types of changes it has not been 
possible to offer more than an informal question –how does this affect overall 
performance of the system?  Recently Greenstone [2009] has argued that our current 
system for evaluating regulations is “broken”. He suggests that: 
 
  “It is largely based on faith, rather than evidence. The efficacy of many 
  regulations is never assessed. Many others are only evaluated before they are 
  implemented—the point when we know the least about them.” (pp. 111-112) 
 
He calls for a culture of persistent experimentation and evaluation. In the context of 
public investment policies his suggestion was first made and illustrated by Haveman 3 
 
[1972]. Indeed his ex post assessment of water resource investments confirmed 
Greenstone’s intuition, concluding that: 
 
  “…this study has demonstrated a need to seriously reappraise the procedures of 
  benefit cost analysis as practiced by agencies. Unless procedures are constantly 
  revised on the basis of performance feedback from existing undertakings, the 
  credibility of ex ante analysis will, and should, be challenged.” (p. 111) 
 
This research was developed to respond to these calls current (and early) for ex post 
assessment. While we don’t know that there was formal benefit-cost analysis of the 
roadway segments we evaluate, it is nonetheless possible to develop an ex post evaluation 
of their effects and to suggest how it can be used to enhance future ex ante assessments of 
projects similar to our example of the South Mountain Freeway. 
  One of the early leaders in transportation economics, Herbert Mohring [1965], 
provides a conceptual basis for using ex ante analysis in setting priorities. He suggested 
that segment specific measures of the quasi rents associated with additions to capacity 
were needed as part of the design and evaluation of policies to maximize the benefits 
from a highway network. He argued that pricing and investment decisions should take 
into account the differential economic importance of the links in highways as a part of 
networks. Much of the literature since that time has grappled with the congestion pricing 
component of his two decision criteria (see Parry [2009] or an overview). However, his 
recommendation to add capacity based on the incremental value of such investments has 
not.  The only research that is close to meeting this challenge is an early effort by Keeler 4 
 
and Small [1977] that used engineering estimates of the relationship between speed and 
highway capacity in reducing congestion. It was primarily intended to estimate ex ante 
tolls assuming optimal capacity. Their analysis did not consider the quasi rents for 
specific highway segments, evaluating instead the effect of measures of capacity and tolls 
on congestion for different roadways in the San Francisco Bay Area.   
A hedonic property value model might seem a natural possibility for 
implementing Mohring’s proposal, especially in situations where one can observe 
housing prices before and after a new road segment is introduced. However, the dual 
challenges of selecting a proxy measure for how a highway segment influences land 
values and uncovering an instrument that convincingly identifies the change in property 
value due to each new segment have proved difficult.  Even if these tasks are addressed 
successfully, there remains a concern about the economic interpretations of what is 
measured.
2 Thus, it should not be surprising to find that this literature is so incomplete. 
  Fortunately circumstances in Phoenix, Arizona offer an opportunity to exploit the 
pattern of residential development in relation to new highway segments to address all 
three concerns. We use four new highway segments developed between 2000 and 2007 to 
estimate the effect of freeway additions as separate treatments influencing residential 
housing values. We estimate subdivision fixed effects to control for unobservable 
attributes of neighborhoods and of the households that select them. Within a Tiebout 
framework, we expect households with similar preferences for neighborhood features to 
sort into similar subdivisions. Under the assumption that the distribution of these 
unobservables in a subdivision does not change over the relatively short time periods 




two step regression model can be used to estimate the treatment effect of highway 
additions. Our application matches the conditions discussed in Starrett’s [1981] classic 
analysis of land markets for full internal capitalization of projects yielding local public 
goods. By using a set of hedonic models, each estimating fixed effects for highway 
segments in each time period, we are able to: estimate the relative value of each new 
highway link; control for unobserved land uses affecting private homes at the subdivision 
level; and use a feasible GLS estimator to take account of the covariance structures for 
the estimated fixed effects in each time period.  
Section two develops the context for interpreting estimates of the residential land 
capitalization of new highway segments as measures of the incremental benefits 
generated by additions to a local highway network. Section three summarizes the key 
elements of our estimating model. It also describes the data used in measuring the 
segment specific capitalization effects. Section four presents the findings and discusses 
their role in contributing to metropolitan Phoenix’s loop road system. In the last section 
we consider two issues. The first concerns whether our method is unique to Phoenix due 
to the specialized nature of these roadway projects in relation to the residential 
development in the area. Second, we discuss the next steps in using roadway and 
residential data similar to Phoenix to develop measures of the ex ante benefits of 
alternative roadway projects such as would be associated with the South Mountain 
project.   
 
II. Land Capitalization and Highway Quasi-Rents 
A. Background 6 
 
  The use of housing prices to estimate the marginal willingness to pay for changes 
in spatial amenities has a long history.
3 Four strategies are currently used to address these 
issues. Each has a mix of data requirements and maintained assumptions. The first 
approach is the traditional one using a single cross section of housing sales to estimate a 
hedonic price function. In the absence of additional information, this strategy is often 
criticized because the information available is regarded as incomplete. An equilibrium 
reflects households sorting among locations for some of the reasons that analysts can 
measure and due to factors that may not be readily observable. These two sets of 
influences (i.e. the observed and unobserved factors impacting the equilibrium) may well 
be interrelated. The result is a reasonable prospect for biased estimates of the effects that 
we seek to measure. This result follows because the factors that cannot be measured and 
are omitted are also often correlated with those that can be observed.  
  A second, reduced form, approach also uses housing prices but relies on external 
events and spatial fixed effects to resolve the dual challenges of unobservables and 
identification. The external change must be related to the amenity of interest and serves 
to identify its effect.
4 It relies on convincing arguments and extensive documentation that 
the external event plays the hypothesized role (see Angrist and Pischke [2010] for 
arguments for this approach and its impact). The third approach proposed by Bajari and 
Benkard [2005] substitutes structural information for the external event. In their scheme a 
structural representation of the choice process allows point estimates to be derived for the 
marginal rate of substitution for the attribute of interest relative to the numeraire good. As 





marginal rate of substitution (MRS) conditional on the assumed preference function and 
the way each application introduces preference heterogeneity. In the simplest cases each 
tradeoff rate is assumed to be fixed for each household. It can vary across households but 
does not vary with the amount of the attribute. As a result, the Bajari and Benkard logic 
must impose restrictions on the hedonic price function to avoid inconsistencies in the 
households’ implied choices and the conditions for constrained utility maximization.
5  
  The fourth set of methods involves full structural models using either a vertical or 
horizontal specification for preferences (see Klaiber and Smith [2009] for a review). This 
approach does not escape the need for instruments.
6 Nonetheless, there is a set of 
maintained assumptions required by these structural models as well.   
Thus, the four methods yield different types of information and impose different 
assumptions that are unlikely to be testable within a single application. We would like to 
be able to interpret these differences in prices in relationship to the tradeoffs people 
would make to acquire the spatial (or temporal) difference hypothesized to lead to the 
price change.  
  Kuminoff and Pope [2010] demonstrate that developing an economic 
interpretation for estimates of capitalization is not straight forward. Extending models by 
Tinbergen [1956] and Epple [1987], they find that the size of the change in the spatial 
attribute and the heterogeneity in both the supply of alternatives as well as in the 
household preferences, are all important to the interpretation of capitalized price changes 








the importance of these general conclusions. In related work Klaiber and Smith [2009] 
used the assignment framework exploited by Cropper, Deck, and McConnell [1988] in 
evaluating specification issues with hedonic models. Their focus was on assessing the 
relationship between measures for housing price capitalization and the “true” general 
equilibrium (GE) willingness to pay. They found the spatial extent of the market for those 
affected by changes in spatial amenities was important to the discrepancy between 
hedonic estimates of the capitalization of exogenous changes in land use and GE 
willingness to pay.  
  In the current analysis the empirical model exploits a combination of spatial 
controls, using subdivision level fixed effects, and temporal controls based on the 
exogenous events associated with the completion dates for each specific highway 
segment. Both sources of information allow us to identify the effects of each new 
highway segment on land values as measured thru shifts in subdivision fixed effects. 
Given we can accept the assumptions of Starrett’s internal capitalization model these 
price differentials can be interpreted as estimates of the average household’s willingness 
to pay for each new highways segment.  
 
B. What Does Capitalization Measure for Roadway Segments? 
  Starrett [1981] identified two types of capitalization as conceptual extremes. 
External capitalization derives from forces between communities. Internal capitalization 
is associated with forces inside communities. Internal is the most relevant concept for 
local public goods where proximity to the public good matters. Starrett used highways as 
one of his examples of local public goods relevant to internal capitalization. We can 9 
 
adapt his basic conceptual framework to explain how residential housing capitalization 
captures the economic value of increments to highway capacity.  Our model begins at the 
household level. Each household is assumed to have a preference function, U
i(.), that 
includes a measure of the public good associated with the highway system, q, and a 
measure of that household’s use of the system, g,  along with the amount of land, l,  and a 
numeraire good, x. The location of links to the network will affect the cost of a trip and 
the value of q.  
  The household decision process envisions a conditional choice of g and l (land) 
given a selection of each location from a discrete set of alternatives. We label these 
potential locational choices as neighborhoods. In our empirical application we implement 
the model by defining a neighborhood to be a subdivision. Maximizing equation (1) for 
each location (where the budget constraint is substituted into the function for the 
numeraire, x) defines a conditional indirect utility function, s(.) for each neighborhood 
(s).  
 
        , , ,             ,         (1) 
where: 
m
i = household income                  ,          
T
i = a head tax on each household 
f(.) = cost of highway use (assumed the same for all households and a function of 
location) 
rs = rental price of land in location s  
 10 
 
There will be no internal capitalization if the conditional indirect utility function 
derived from this choice problem, vs
i, is independent of the neighborhood. There must be 
a spatial distinction before and after each project that adds to the highway system for a 
welfare interpretation of price capitalization using this model. Following Starrett and 
assuming preferences are quasi linear in the numeraire and additively separable with q 
and g entering one component, land another, the envelop condition can be used to define 
cases that preclude internal capitalization. These situations arise when the expression 
defined in equation (2) is independent of s. We start by identifying this case as an 
extreme. It helps to explain situations where the equilibrium admits capitalization. When 
the indirect utility function is independent of the neighborhood, then there is no scope for 
the rent to adjust to q. There is no spatial differentiation across neighborhoods and the 
effects of a change in the public good are independent of the neighborhood selected. 
When rents do differ by neighborhood, they change with q, equation (2) describes the 
tradeoffs households in each neighborhood would make in equilibrium (s and m are 
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As Starrett explains 
 
“There are two principal assumptions which taken together guarantee project 








that all the benefits of the project must be ‘intramarginal’ in that boundary 
residents are marginally unaffected. …The second necessary assumption is that 
residents do not tend to sort themselves out within the town according to their 
relative preference for the public good.” (pp 313-314), emphasis added.   
 
The first assumption amounts to saying we can identify a control community where the 
public good has no effect on the residents. He refers to these as boundary communities. 
The second refers to an absence of within community preference heterogeneity in tastes 
for public goods.
8 
  In this setting Starrett first proposes considering the change in land rents for the 
boundary community in response to a change in q to measure a project’s benefits. With 
the assumption that land in the community is owned by local residents (as opposed to 
rented), the analysis must consider the effects of increases in demand for land across all 
neighborhoods and adjust for the effects of that change in recovering the differential 
change due to q for the neighborhoods assumed to be impacted. These are the treated 
subdivisions in our empirical model.  
  We can adapt equation (2) using the definition of the boundary community 
(labeled with the subscript  ), together with the household sorting that leads to 
equalization of the net contribution to utility and defines equilibrium adjustments due to a 
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The first term on the right side of equation (3) is zero because   is a boundary 
community. The second term (  
   
   ) will depend on whether the project affects the 
overall demand for land. If it does, then we have the general form of a difference in 
difference model in equation (4). 
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The left side of this expression describes the difference in the change in land prices due to 
project for the affected community (s) compared to the change in land prices due to the 
overall demand changes (and other factors potentially) induced indirectly by the project 
for the boundary (or control) community ( ), where we assume households experience 
no gain due to the change in q. This formulation clearly displays that two differences are 
needed. The project’s impact (and the change in q due to it) for the communities that 
experience the gain and the indirect effects on controls that do not experience gains (due 
to area wide changes in the demand for land). 
If we further expand the model and allow for preference heterogeneity within 
communities (a situation that was assumed away in the basic development), Starrett 
argues that land rents will tend to undercapitalize the benefits of a change in q. This result 
follows, in part, from a stability condition for the town structure. For our purposes, we 
must assume that households are homogeneous within each neighborhood. To do 13 
 
otherwise, as we discuss at the close of the paper, requires a structural model with 
maintained assumptions characterizing household heterogeneity. Our estimates for the 
effect of the additions to the highway network assume that the roadway effects can take 
two forms. In our basic model the effect is constant for each neighborhood. In the second 
specification the effect varies based on the inverse distance to the highway segment. For 
the remaining terms in the model, Starrett’s separability assumptions assure that there is 
no adjustment in response to changes in q.  
The effects of roadways in our application are not continuous. They are assumed 
to be capitalized at the subdivision level. The ability to distinguish these subdivisions 
from assessor records is important to our strategy for identifying the incremental 
willingness to pay for enhanced accessibility. In Phoenix the homes in each of the 
subdivisions have lot sizes that are approximately equal. This feature implies that once 
households select a neighborhood, sorting assures they will have comparable demands for 
lot size as well as all the other attributes conveyed by that subdivision. We assumed in 
our model that households’ costs of using the roadway, as represented by f(.), were the 
same.  
  As we noted the measure in (4) requires two things: (1) home sales and the 
identification of their locations in subdivisions and (2) a change in accessibility due to 
changes in highway segments (i.e. the dq). Without this change in roadway segments we 
don’t have a difference in accessibility that can be distinguished from the subdivision 
fixed effect. We have instead the equivalent of what Starrett intends to be measured with 
(lsrs-lσrσ) given the lot size features of subdivisions in Phoenix. In his framework the 
other features of houses (and lots) are held constant. The only reason for land rents to 14 
 
differ across neighborhoods (or in our case subdivisions) is due to differences in the 
amount of q available to households who live in each. To measure the effects of changes 
in q we need some basis for measuring how rs and rσ change with q. Thus, adding the 
ability to observe these subdivision effects over time with the completion of new 
roadway segments provides this opportunity. (i.e. measuring   
   
       
   
  ). 
We can measure these changes by having access to information on housing sales 
before and after each highway segment’s completion and opening. Thus, a difference in 
these fixed effects with each opening or, equivalently, a difference in differences 
approximates the left side of equation (4). Sorting assures all other contributions that 
would distinguish partial and general equilibrium effects are at the ex post equilibrium 
values. If we assume an algebraic relationship between the proximity of a subdivision to  
completed roadways, then our strategy of using subdivision fixed effects over time 
together with this measure can be interpreted as a variant of the Athey and Imbens[2006] 
change in changes approach to measuring the effects of the treatment. 
  Overall, then, our empirical model tests the internal capitalization condition 
directly. The subdivision fixed effects measure the contribution to the housing prices in a 
neighborhood as a result of each house’s location in that area. These effects account for 
the unobserved factors that distinguish home prices in a particular neighborhood from all 
others, after controlling for house attributes, the lot size, and other observables. If 
measures of highway segments fail to be significantly related to the subdivision effects’ 
changes over time, then we conclude that there was no new internal capitalization.  
  Of course, one might argue that roadways are planned long in advance and, once 
the path is known, the value of accessibility should already be capitalized into the 15 
 
subdivision fixed effects. Certainly it is true that roadways require significant lead time. 
However, the anticipated effects measure ex ante beliefs that cannot be recovered using 
subdivision fixed effects without additional information. We seek to estimate what people 
believe they would be obtaining.
 9 Diversity in beliefs would not necessarily be 
reconciled thru sorting, though it is reasonable to expect those with the strongest 
preferences for access would move first. These expectations should make it more difficult 
for us to estimate the ex post general equilibrium effect. If households perfectly 
anticipated the gains (there were no unanticipated general equilibrium effects due to 
access), then there should not be a significant change in subdivision fixed effects for the 
treatment group (those with increased accessibility due to the new roadway) compared to 
the change in those for the control neighborhoods between the time spans involved.  
As we noted earlier, internal capitalization also requires that the benefits are 
“intra-marginal.” Starrett explains that in cases like ours this condition means that some 
neighborhoods realize no gains from increments to the local public good. In our case it 
translates into an assumption that not all subdivisions within the overall area benefit from 
each new highway segment. This assumption means that we need to define a set of 
subdivisions that serve as controls in both spatial and temporal terms. In practice this 
requirement implies we assume that at some distance from a new segment the roadway’s 
role in creating increased access to the network has no value. This condition is consistent 
with the features of a loop roadway that provides a highway network within a 
metropolitan area but is not enhancing connections to outside metropolitan areas. The 





metropolitan Phoenix, but do not change the area’s accessibility to other more distant 
population centers. We assume the added segments have primarily a local value and will 
be important to subdivisions near it. To meet this condition we impose a three mile 
threshold for effects as a maintained hypothesis for our second step estimates.
10 
  When these conditions are satisfied the incremental benefits of additions to a 
public good are measured by residential land capitalization. These increments could be 
used to estimate the net quasi-rents due to the project. Starrett’s proof of this result makes 
strong assumptions about preferences and assumes the lump sum taxes imposed on 
households cover the incremental costs of the increases to public goods  and that 
household income includes profit shares, rental income on land, and labor earnings, with 
the latter unaffected by increments to q.
11 
  While these are important maintained assumptions in his general capitalization 
result, our strategy uses them as a starting point for interpreting the empirical results. We 
do not argue that our findings offer measures of the aggregate quasi-rents for highway 
segments. Instead we suggest they offer a basis for ranking the segments and discuss in 
the closing section some strategies for extending the analysis for ex ante assessment of 
these aggregate quasi rents. 
 
III. Empirical Model and Data 
A. Empirical Model 
                                                        
10 We investigated the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications of this threshold and the basic 
conclusions are maintained. In particular, we examined a 5 mile cutoff and found that magnitudes of 
parameters decreased, but signs and significance were maintained. 
11 There are differences in property tax rates across some of the municipalities and school districts within 
our study area, Maricopa County, but these will also be controlled with our subdivision fixed effects.  
Moreover, the roadways are paid thru county wide sales taxes not property taxes directly associated with 
the roadways 17 
 
  Our analysis uses on a two step hedonic property value model. Separate first-stage 
models are estimated for housing sales in each of five periods – a control time span 
before the new roadways are completed and four other periods with time spans defined 
by the sequential dates for the opening of each of the four highway segments. Our sample 
includes all subdivisions with at least 13 sales per time period. Each model includes a full 
set of variables describing the homes’ characteristics and the attributes conveyed by 
location as well as fixed effects identifying the subdivisions in each time span. Equation 
(5) specifies the general form for the first-stage hedonic model specification, a semi-log 
equation. It maintains that the housing sales price, (Pi) is a function of housing and lot 
characteristics, a monthly time index, and subdivision fixed effects. 
 
ln          ∑            ∑                      (5) 
where: 
t = identifies the time periods for each sample 
cji = designates housing and lot characteristics 
ski = corresponds to subdivision fixed effects 
Mt = monthly time trend 
i = unobserved error 
 
The second step “stacks” the five sets of estimates for the subdivision fixed effects in a 
single sample to allow these effects to be used to estimate the effects of two different 
characterizations of roadway effects on the homes in each subdivision. The model is an 
unbalanced panel with different subdivisions affected by the highway segments in each 18 
 
time interval.
12 When subdivisions appear in repeated sub-samples over time the 
qualitative terms for highway segments are coded so that they influence land values (thru 
the subdivision fixed effects) from the point of completion of the roadway until the end 
of the sample period. Equation (6) specifies the estimated subdivision fixed effects to be 
a function of an indicator variable that identifies subdivisions that satisfy two conditions. 
They are within three miles of each new roadway segment and the sales were after that 
highway segment opened. The model also includes a fixed effect to capture noise and dis-
amenity attributed to subdivisions within 1,500 feet of a highway segment. This effect is 
interacted with the timing fixed effect. Finally a measure of distance to the central 
business district is included.  
We consider the proximity to each highway segment in two different formats: (a) 
the primary model is a fixed effect for the subdivisions within three miles of the roadway 
segment (this corresponds to what we labeled earlier as the difference in differences 
effect); and (b) the second uses the inverse distance to the roadway truncated to zero at 3 
miles (this approach is a variation on the Athey and Imbens change in changes model). 
This formulation gauges the sensitivity of our findings to treating the highway effect as 
fixed.
13 After each roadway opens these variables (and the fixed effects identifying 
subdivisions adjacent to each segment) are assumed to continue to exert an influence on 
the subdivisions’ contribution to housing sales prices.  
 
                                                        
12 In addition to different segments, it is possible that we might not observe a minimum of 13 sales within a 
subdivision for some time periods. Either outcome would remove a subdivision from the housing sales 





         ∑          
 
      ∑           
 
                  (6) 
    = corresponds to either the dummy variable for the distance interval (or the inverse 
distance of road segment l from subdivision k for the robustness check) 
     = 1 if the road segment was opened in the time period defining interval t or in a 
previous time period 
        = 0 otherwise 
      = 1 if the subdivision was adjacent to a completed highway segment during the 
period  
         = 0 otherwise 
       = distance of subdivision k to the central business district. 
 
Our two step strategy requires that we have estimates of both the fixed effects and 
their covariance structure. By applying a Cholesky decomposition to each estimated 
covariance structure for the fixed effects from each first stage model, the variables in 
equation (6) may be transformed so that the feasible generalized least squares estimator 
required for the second stage model can be derived using ordinary least squares with the 
transformed “stacked” data.
14 This decomposition is especially convenient because there 
are over 15,000 subdivisions included in the full sample over all five sub-periods.    
  Equation (6) hypothesizes two types of effects for the treated subdivisions. The 
first assumes that once a highway opens all homes experience a constant percentage 







as subsequent segments open due to the definition of the time fixed effect (Dlrt). For 
subdivisions adjacent to a segment there may well be dis-amenity effects due to noise or 
pollution. Changes in land uses near segments such as strip malls or commercial 
structures could also be expected to influence these subdivision terms. The fixed effects 
identifying adjacent subdivisions will capture the net impact of all of these influences.  
  In a second specification, we consider the possibility of spillover effects between 
highway segments. To describe how this was implemented it is important to outline the 
spatial structure of the changes in the highway system and then describe how interactions 
between segments were hypothesized to alter the contribution of each new segment to the 
accessibility of each subdivision to other areas within the metropolitan area.  
  During this time span several major loop freeways in the Phoenix area were 
completed. This overall process for expanding the loop roadway involved four major 
segments. Figure 2 displays the segments with color coding for the Price segment 
(green), the Pima (blue), Santan (black) and connector (red). The southern segment of 
Loop 101 (Price) connecting the cities of Tempe and Chandler was completed in 
December 2000. The northern segment (Pima) connecting Scottsdale to Tempe was 
completed in April 2002. Another project linking the Loop 101 with Interstate 10, a 
major interstate, opened in November 2003 (connector). The second loop roadway, Loop 
202, opened in June 2006 with the completion of a 12 mile segment of the Loop 202 
joining the southern section of the Loop 202 Freeway linking Loop 101 and US 60 
through the cities of Chandler and Gilbert (Santan).  
  A closer look at the segment labeled Price indicates that it is along the eastern 
boundary of Phoenix. It is a north-south segment linking the southern (and middle) 21 
 
residential areas to the major east-west connectors (i.e. Route 10 and 60). The Pima 
component completes this north-south link providing access to and from Scottsdale and 
provides an east-west thoroughfare connecting at the northern edge of the metro area. Our 
spillover hypothesis suggests that completing the Pima segment may change the value of 
the Price segment. A similar argument could be applied to the Price connector and Santan 
segments along the southern boundary providing another east-west link to Interstate 
Route 10. These effects are tested by introducing different sets of interactions of the 
separate fixed effects for each roadway segment.  
  
B. Data and First Stage Results 
  Our application involves over 600,000 sales of private homes in Maricopa County 
from January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2007. Table 1 identifies the time period corresponding 
to each completed segment, the number of subdivisions that had sales affected by each 
highway segment, as well as the control time period. Table 2 provides two sets of 
summary statistics. The top panel describes the characteristics of the properties involved 
in housing sales. This includes the mean, standard deviation, the minimum, and the 
maximum values for price and variables describing the characteristics of each house. In 
addition it includes the distance between the centroid for each house and the roadway 
segments. The bottom panel describes the features of the subdivisions included in our 
sample. It reports the average number as well as the size of the smallest and largest 
subdivision and the years they were built.  
Table 3 provides estimates of the hedonic price equations for each time period. 
The values in bold designate the estimated parameters that were significantly different 22 
 
from zero with p-values of 0.10 or less. Following many previous hedonic studies, our 
specification includes quadratic effects for age, lot size, and house size. Overall, the 
effects of housing attributes were quite stable over the eight years comprising our sample 
period and generally agree with our expectations for the effects of each of these structural 
variables. The relative stability of the estimated parameters over time suggests that these 
coefficients reflect the construction costs during the period. Locational effects of where 
houses are placed are captured by the subdivision fixed effects. We do not report specific 
estimates for the fixed effects for the subdivisions estimated separately for each time 
period.  
We selected two roadway segments-Price and Pima and developed kernel density 
estimates for the fixed effects (using the three mile threshold) to identify treated and 
control subdivisions in each time period. Figure 3 displays the results for the first 
roadway segment to be completed, the Price, and Figure 4 is the Pima segment. In each 
figure we display the density estimated for the treated (blue) and control (red) subdivision 
fixed effects by sub-period and for the overall sample. The effects of each roadway on the 
values of the affected subdivisions are clearest using the sub-period plots. For the Price in 
sub-periods 3, 4, and 5 there is a clear displacement of the treated subdivisions to yield 
larger estimated changes in the fixed effects than the control compared to the base time 
period. This is the distinction that our second stage model isolates for each roadway 
segment. The second stage model acknowledges that the fixed effects are not 
independently estimated and takes account of these correlations with the feasible 
generalized least squares estimator. These sample kernel density estimates assume 23 
 
independence. Nonetheless these simple graphs are useful in providing a general idea of 
what the second stage models are capturing.  
The Pima kernel estimates display the shift in fixed effects for this roadway 
segment as well. There is no period two in this case because the first time period after this 
roadway was completed is our period three. All three periods for the Pima display a shift 
and the full time period (in the last panel) more clearly displays the treatment effect. As 
we discuss in the next section, the connector and the Santan segments do not have as 
large an influence as the Pima and Price. As a result, we do not report kernel density 
estimates for them.  
  Figures 5a thru 5d display the clustering of the subdivisions that are serving as the 
treated cases for each highway segment (in red) and the controls (in black). As the figures 
confirm there is a clear delineation of the treatments used for each segment.  
 
IV. Estimates of the Incremental Values for New Highway Segments 
  Table 4 presents five different specifications of the second stage model. The first 
panel is the simplest model with the fixed effect terms for each roadway, including 
whether the subdivision is within three miles of roadway segment and the time period for 
the hedonic model was after the completion of the segment. This simplest specification 
also identifies whether a subdivision was adjacent to the segment and includes the 
distance to the Central Business District (CBD). The second panel includes these 
variables along with interaction effects to consider spillover effects that are associated 
with directional spillovers. The third panel focuses on spillovers that focus on connection 
effects between new and existing roadway segments. The fourth includes all fixed effects 24 
 
and interaction variables. The last is a robustness check replacing the fixed effects with 
the inverse distance between subdivisions and relevant roadway segments. 
  Our primary focus is on the estimates treating the highway as a fixed effect with 
an implied constant mean effect (in percentage terms) for the subdivisions impacted by 
each new highway segment. Regardless of whether the fixed effect (the first panel) or the 
inverse distance (fifth panel) is used, there is a clear ranking of the contributions of 
different highway segments to housing prices, with the north / south Pima segment the 
most important, increasing housing prices by about twenty four percent. The Price/10 
connector has the second largest impact that is significant and stable, indicating a thirteen 
percent increase in housing prices for homes in a subdivision near this segment after it 
was completed. The remaining segments also have significant effects on the subdivision’s 
contributions to prices with a mean effect of seven percent for the Santan segment and 
about four percent for the Price segment. 
  The models considering spillover effects are defined using interaction terms under 
a “directional” or “connection” based rationale. These interactions are only significant 
when they involve the Price segments. They do not appear to alter the overall effect for 
composites of the completed roadway segment, suggesting that the simpler formulation 
offers the best description of the highway segments’ effects. That is, assuming separate 
fixed effects offers the best guide to the relative importance of each highway component. 
The fixed effects for adjacent impacts are only statistically significant for the north / 
south Pima segment using the full fixed effects specification. This effect reflects a large 
set of land use changes that took place in the areas around this segment because of its 
enhanced accessibility. Figure 5a illustrates the location of the subdivisions along this 25 
 
segment. There has also been significant commercial development in this area that 
closely aligns with the roadway. The composite of these two impacts on the adjacent 
subdivisions is reflected in these fixed effects. 
  The last component of our analysis is in the fifth panel of Table 4. We estimate no 
spillover (i.e. interactions between segments) model replacing a fixed effect for 
subdivisions within each roadway segment with the inverse distance for the centroid of 
the subdivision in relation to the closest point of the roadway. This term is interacted with 
the fixed effect identifying when each segment opened (i.e. the   in equation (6)).  
Two conclusions emerge from this gauge of the sensitivity of our findings. First, 
as we noted at the outset of this discussion of findings, our conclusions about the ranking 
and statistical significance of these new roadway effects remain stable for the segments 
with the largest effects. Second, when we evaluate the estimates at the mean of the 
inverse distance for the treated subdivision in our sample, the estimated average effect is 
consistent but smaller compared to what we found with the models that assumed the 
effects were constant. Only the Santan and Price display results that switch order of 
importance and these would not be significant differences. More specifically, the 
estimates at the mean values for the inverse distance are: 12 percent for Pima, 5 percent 
for the connector to the Price, 2.3 percent for the Santan and 2.5 percent for the Price 
segment.  
Our adaptation of Starrett’s model suggests the difference in differences logic 
recovers increments that reflect the sorting response of households to each neighborhood 
after each change. These estimates provide the ex post increments to the willingness to 
pay attributable to each roadway’s contribution to accessibility. At an aggregate level 26 
 
they are approximate because we are using the average proportionate change together 
with the average house price to estimate average increments.
15 At best then, the results 
should be interpreted as ranking the segments. In Table 5 we report a simple 
approximation using the percentage increment for each roadway segment and the average 
of the sales prices in the affected subdivisions to provide an order of magnitude measure 
of these effects in comparison to the costs for each roadway segment. 
As cautioned earlier these are not estimates of aggregate quasi rents. We are 
gauging the size of the overall effects to judge whether small percentage effects on the 
average subdivision for some roadway segments considered together with the number of 
houses in these neighborhoods would change the ranking due to the number of affected 
properties. In our case they would. The top ranked roadway segment remains unchanged 
but the ordering of the others would be affected. This finding reinforced the need to 
consider measuring both the average treatment effect and assessing the size of the 
impacted area in the design of ex post evaluations. While there are many assumptions to 
interpret these as benefit measures, for many purposes even the aggregate capitalized 
value of specific segments offers sufficient information to gauge the importance of the 
roadway segments. 
Table 5 provides the elements that contribute to our estimate of aggregate changes 
to evaluate our segment ranking. The first two columns report the number of houses near 
each segment and those defined as adjacent to the roadway. Recall our estimates 
                                                        
15 i.e. if ∆q; is the change in accessibility due to segment j, then the WTP
i for household i would be:  
                                   
    ∆     ,   , 
 ,          
    
        ,           
     
                                   
   ,   ,   ,      
       ,                   
Where * and ~ identify the differences in the utilization and land with and without the increased 
accessibility implied by 
j q  . 
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suggested that subdivisions near the roadway gained relative to controls but the gain was 
reduced somewhat if these areas had homes that were adjacent to the roadway. Hence 
both factors need to be considered in computing the increment to an aggregate for each 
highway segment. The next four columns report the number of sales and average prices 
for home affected by each highway segment. These are taken from the treated 
subdivisions. We distinguish whether they are near or adjacent to the highway. The 
seventh column reports our estimate for aggregate increment to evaluate our ranking 
based on fixed effects alone. 
If we use them as an order of magnitude gauge of the importance of the roadway 
segments and compare them to the costs of each segment, we would conclude that all 
have had impacts on land values that clearly exceed their costs.
16  
Ideally, a full benefit cost analysis would includea more complete accounting of 
who gains and loses. As Mohring [1961] suggested, there are both gainers and losers 
across each metro area. Starrett’s model assumes any income effects of capitalization will 
be reflected in the bids for residential properties. We suspect, due to the rapid population 
growth during the period of our sample’s transactions, that these roadways influenced the 
placement of new subdivisions and thus channeled growth of residential housing. Our use 
of controls to capture the boundary effects takes account of some of these influences. 
Real housing prices in other areas probably did not decline over this period. The influx of 
new households may have been responsible for avoiding a relative decline in real prices 
for the areas that might have failed to gain access to the overall area during the period we 
                                                        
16 Cost estimates are obtained from yearly certification reports prepared by the Arizona Department of 
Transportation.  These reports show the progression of the freeway system as well as the costs for each 
segment.  When possible, we use the cost associated with segments under construction rather than the 
estimated pre-construction costs. 28 
 
study. This is why Starrett’s argument to consider the effects of overall land demands on 
the boundary community’s land values is important to detecting the net effect of each 
highway segment. A structural model would be needed to judge how these aggregate 




Mohring’s [1965] call for greater attention to marginal cost pricing and economic 
principles in managing existing roadways and in evaluating increments to their capacity 
seems especially relevant to today’s policy climate where increased infrastructure 
investment is viewed as especially important as a stimulus for aggregate economic 
activity and as a long term need for economic growth. Research considering the 
implementation of Mohring’s proposal for evaluating highway investments has been 
virtually non-existent.  
  We argued that Starrett’s capitalization results can provide an effective rational 
for measuring the gains (at the subdivision level) due to highway segments that generate 
primarily local benefits within a metropolitan network. Our example is based on key 
segments added to the loop roadways around metro Phoenix between 2000 and 2007. An 
important question is whether it is possible to exploit the results from this type of analysis 
to evaluate the ex ante incremental benefits from potential additions to other roadway 
systems.  
  We answer this question in two ways.  First, for Metropolitan Phoenix, which 





our results help provide guidance for the best types of roadways to target for additional 
infrastructure spending.  In fact, the first roadway targeted for the expansion of HOV 
lanes was the Pima Freeway, consistent with our findings that this roadway is associated 
with the largest capitalized benefit.   
In terms of using our results to inform policymakers in other areas, our results are 
not likely to translate directly.  However, there is a link between the way Starrett posed 
the question of internal capitalization and the current generation of vertical sorting 
models (see Sieg et al [2004]) that may be worth pursuing in developing a calibrated land 
valuation model for this task. Starrett’s neighborhood effects are similar to the effects of 
local public goods in the Epple-Sieg [1999] vertical sorting model. That is, in these 
models, the equilibrium conditions under the assumption preferences satisfy the single 
crossing condition imply housing prices and public goods are linked. The nature of the 
link depends on the preference specification. For the case of the CES function used in 
Sieg et.al [2004] there is a simple updating rule linking neighborhood price indexes and 
the neighborhood specific public goods. The relation exploits the ascending bundle 
property of the equilibrium. This condition assures neighborhoods will be ranked the 
same way if compared by housing (or land) prices or an index of public goods. Thus, the 
prices and public goods indexes of adjoining neighborhoods (in the sense of being ranked 
together) can be used to structure an updating rule for prices if the public goods change or 
to compute the index of local public goods if the prices are different. It is this relationship 
that could be used to calibrate preferences. 
  A sketch of the logic would proceed as follows. We would need to observe 
housing prices before and after a highway project to estimate price indexes for a set of 30 
 
neighborhoods comprising the choice set relevant for the market equilibrium in the area 
where we would like to project the benefit of the improvement. The new location’s 
application need not have the level of experimental detail distinguishing treatment and 
control neighborhoods, as in the case of our Phoenix example. It would require the before 
and after price indexes, and measures of the neighborhoods used to get the relationship to 
the new roadway. Under these conditions, the estimated effects of new roadway 
proximity from Phoenix could be used as relative values in the new location—a 
calibration would attempt to use them in a public goods index to estimate the post project 
prices.  
  Klaiber and Smith [forthcoming] have found support for a vertical sorting model 
for Maricopa County based on local school quality using school districts as the basic 
choice alternatives. Augmenting it to reflect our findings here would require significant 
additional information and qualifying “ifs” and assumptions. Nonetheless, the basic point 
is that using the structural foundation of the internal capitalization model is one way to 
extend the results where the conditions associated with highway developments did not 
offer the controls offered by our example.  
  Even if this scheme is judged too arbitrary for most highway projects, there is 
scope for exploiting Starrett’s internal capitalization within a DD framework. Over the 
past decade—rapidly growing areas like Las Vegas, Nevada, the Research Triangle area 
of North Carolina and suburban Atlanta, Georgia as well as other areas may well offer 
examples where this logic could be replicated to judge the overall viability of Mohring’s 
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1 13 3,144 January 1, 1999 to December 22, 2000
21 3 1 , 8 4 4 D e c e m b e r  23, 2000 to April 7, 2002
31 3 3 , 1 6 2 A p r i l  8, 2002 to November 16, 2003
41 3 6 , 0 3 4 N o v e m b e r  17, 2003 to June 11, 2006










Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Price 236850 265143 17000 1.00E+07
Square Feet  1951 720 600 5997
Acres 0.19 0.13 0.05 6.790381
Stories 1.24 0.43 1 4
Bathrooms 2.69 0.81 0.5 6




a 18.15 9.74 0.01 63.56
Pima Distance 11.60 6.27 0.01 59.40
Connector Distance 20.35 10.29 0.02 65.87
Santan Distance 20.57 13.26 0.04 69.72
Size (N=10,696) 88.56 83.45 13 1115
Number of Sales 39.36 45.82 13 855
Year Built 1988.09 14.90 1925 2007
Age at Sale 15.88 14.92 1 81








V a r i a b l e 12345
Square Feet (100s)
1 0.0437 0.0449 0.0440 0.0410 0.0415
Acres 0.5296 0.6106 0.5650 0.4921 0.7211
Stories ‐0.0396 ‐0.0566 ‐0.0576 ‐0.0400 ‐0.0480
Bathrooms 0.0291 0.0350 0.0343 0.0250 0.0245
Age 0.0014 0.0008 ‐0.0039 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0070
Garage 0.0475 0.0382 0.0463 0.0179 0.0074
Pool 0.0363 0.0368 0.0435 0.0499 0.0518
Age Sq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Acres Sq ‐0.1572 ‐0.1988 ‐0.1138 ‐0.0893 ‐0.2120
Square Feet Sq ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003
Monthly Trend 0.0061 0.0000 0.0043 0.0228 ‐0.0059
# Observations 114,143 62,779 107,556 283,888 51,128
Adjusted R






Variable Estimate Std Err t‐Stat Estimate Std Err t‐Stat Estimate Std Err t‐Stat Estimate Std Err t‐Stat Estimate Std Err t‐Stat
Price Dummy 0.0372 0.01 3.7900 0.1008 0.03 3.3700 0.0872 0.02 5.7900 0.1006 0.03 3.3700 0.0229 0.0066 3.4598
Pima Dummy 0.2359 0.01 31.4100 0.2361 0.01 31.4500 0.2375 0.01 31.6100 0.2378 0.01 31.6400 0.0995 0.0056 17.6222
Connector Dummy 0.1346 0.02 8.9400 0.1428 0.02 8.9600 0.1589 0.02 9.6300 0.1634 0.02 9.7700 0.0521 0.0118 4.4104
Santan Dummy 0.0729 0.01 5.1400 0.0752 0.01 5.2000 0.0757 0.01 5.2400 0.0743 0.01 5.1300 0.016 0.0066 2.4187
Adjacent Price 0.0087 0.03 0.3300 0.0091 0.03 0.3400 0.0121 0.03 0.4600 0.0120 0.03 0.4600 ‐0.047 0.0375 ‐1.2519
Adjacent Pima ‐0.0322 0.02 ‐1.6400 ‐0.0325 0.02 ‐1.6500 ‐0.0326 0.02 ‐1.6500 ‐0.0331 0.02 ‐1.6800 ‐0.2785 0.0316 ‐8.8272
Adjacent Connector ‐0.0061 0.05 ‐0.1300 ‐0.0035 0.05 ‐0.0700 ‐0.0050 0.05 ‐0.1100 ‐0.0050 0.05 ‐0.1100 ‐0.0895 0.0656 ‐1.3647
Adjacent Santan 0.0085 0.02 0.4600 0.0077 0.02 0.4100 0.0086 0.02 0.4600 0.0091 0.02 0.4900 0.0104 0.0214 0.4832
Phoenix CBD 0.0026 0.00 8.3500 0.0026 0.00 8.3700 0.0026 0.00 8.4700 0.0026 0.00 8.4900 0.0021 0.0003 6.8584
Constant 10.2328 0.02 446.7800 10.2328 0.02 446.8100 10.2323 0.02 446.9800 10.2319 0.02 446.9600 10.234 0.0234 436.6595
Price/Pima
b ‐0.0706 0.03 ‐2.2500 ‐0.0179 0.03 ‐0.5200
Price/Connector Dummy ‐0.0844 0.02 ‐4.3600 ‐0.0876 0.02 ‐4.0300
Price/Santan 0.0600 0.04 1.6200







House Population Adjacent Near # Sales Avg Price # Sales Avg Price A B C D
Price Freeway 5,015 76,032 1,122 206,573 21,090 216,947 622,979,481 506,515,766 58,252,701 921,150,516 175,000,000 12.5 73,692,041 14,000,000
Pima Freeway 7,052 116,220 2,449 235,562 33,064 299,323 8,152,247,595 8,159,489,361 8,208,565,305 8,217,003,271 380,000,000 30 273,900,109 12,666,667
Connector Freeway 1,360 41,341 348 248,711 7,925 278,058 1,545,472,747 1,288,324,459 1,496,027,161 1,111,862,080 120,000,000 5 222,372,416 24,000,000
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Figure 4.  Pima Segment; Estimated Density 
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(a) Price Freeway Subdivisions 
 
 
 
(b) Pima Freeway Subdivisions 
 
Figure 5:  Housing transactions in Subdivisions used during analysis 
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(c) Connector Subdivisions 
 
 
 
(d) Santan Freeway Subdivisions 
 
Figure 5: continued 
 
 
 